Venue: AM310 (Lingnan University Campus)
9:45–11:15: Chris Atkinson (Lingnan University)
An Imaginative Look at the Ontology of Dreams
Orthodox dream theorists hold that dream experience is akin to waking perceptual experience of an hallucinatory nature. On this view, dreams involve percepts and genuine beliefs (that persist for the period of the dream). In contrast, a number of theorists have recently proposed an imagination model of dreams, such that dream experience is an essentially imaginative experience. According to this view, dreams involve images (as opposed to percepts) and do not involve genuine beliefs (even for the period of the dream). In this talk, I will discuss some of the merits and demerits of each of these positions, with the overarching aim of reaching a compromise. I suggest that dream experience is an imaginative process involving genuine beliefs.
11:15–11:30: Break
11:30–13:00: Lu Teng (NYU-Shanghai)
Cognitive Penetration: Inferentialism vs. Fabricationism
The cognitive penetrability of perception roughly refers to the psychological possibility that our beliefs, expectations, or other personal-level mental states can influence what we perceive. In this talk, I discuss the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration and how etiology matters to the epistemology of perception. I first examine a prominent view in the literature, according to which some cognitively penetrated experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences, and just as beliefs resulting from bad inferences can be unjustified, experiences resulting from bad inferences can fail to justify. I argue that while one version of this view is psychologically implausible, the other version leads to skeptical consequences. Then I propose an alternative view to explain the epistemology of cognitive penetration, which draws inspiration from the epistemology of imagining. I draw empirical evidence to argue that if cognitive penetration happens, then it is plausible that imagining plays an important role. I apply the epistemology of imagining to cognitive penetration and contend that because of the role imagining plays in cognitive penetration, some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences can fail to justify.
13:00–14:30: Lunch
14:30–16:00: Daniel Waxman (Lingnan University)
Imagining the Infinite
When considering the phenomenology and philosophy of mathematics it is sometimes hard not to slip into talking of a faculty of mathematical intuition. However, the idea that we have such a faculty is on reflection extremely problematic and gives rise to many pressing, even insurmountable, philosophical puzzles. My aim in this talk will be to examine the extent to which the cognitive and epistemological role traditionally assigned to mathematical intuition can be played, in contrast, by a kind of sensory or quasi-perceptual imagination. I'll argue for the (perhaps surprising) claim that we can imagine scenarios in which some of our best mathematical theories are true; since these mathematical theories postulate infinite objects, this implicates an ability on our part to imagine the infinite. In order to substantiate this claim I will introduce and sketch a dynamic conception of imagination. I will conclude by discussing some of its possible epistemological implications.
16:00–16:15: Break
16:15–17:45: Neil Van Leeuwen (Georgia State University)
Pretense is Representation
What is it to pretend? My hypothesis comes from the language we use to describe pretense. We talk about pretense behaviors as though they have contents. “He's pretending that he is a dinosaur.” “She's pretending that a swarm of bees is attacking her.” “They are pretending that they are in a duel.” These descriptions are interesting precisely because the majority of behaviors do not have contents. Going to the bank, for example, does not have contents. It’s just going to the bank. One does not, “go to the bank that p.” Nor does one, “eat a sandwich that q.” But when we describe pretending, we often do describe it—the behavior itself—as having propositional content. For example, “He is pretending that he’s riding a horse.” I thus propose that pretense behaviors are themselves representations. More specifically, to pretend that p is to produce, using one’s body and other props, a representation that has p as content, where one’s body, one’s motions, and one’s props are constituents of the representation. In this talk, I develop and refine this view, note some problems it solves, contrast it with competitors, and develop an action theory of pretense based partly on Goldman's (1970) A Theory of Human Action.
9:45–11:15: Chris Atkinson (Lingnan University)
An Imaginative Look at the Ontology of Dreams
Orthodox dream theorists hold that dream experience is akin to waking perceptual experience of an hallucinatory nature. On this view, dreams involve percepts and genuine beliefs (that persist for the period of the dream). In contrast, a number of theorists have recently proposed an imagination model of dreams, such that dream experience is an essentially imaginative experience. According to this view, dreams involve images (as opposed to percepts) and do not involve genuine beliefs (even for the period of the dream). In this talk, I will discuss some of the merits and demerits of each of these positions, with the overarching aim of reaching a compromise. I suggest that dream experience is an imaginative process involving genuine beliefs.
11:15–11:30: Break
11:30–13:00: Lu Teng (NYU-Shanghai)
Cognitive Penetration: Inferentialism vs. Fabricationism
The cognitive penetrability of perception roughly refers to the psychological possibility that our beliefs, expectations, or other personal-level mental states can influence what we perceive. In this talk, I discuss the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration and how etiology matters to the epistemology of perception. I first examine a prominent view in the literature, according to which some cognitively penetrated experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences, and just as beliefs resulting from bad inferences can be unjustified, experiences resulting from bad inferences can fail to justify. I argue that while one version of this view is psychologically implausible, the other version leads to skeptical consequences. Then I propose an alternative view to explain the epistemology of cognitive penetration, which draws inspiration from the epistemology of imagining. I draw empirical evidence to argue that if cognitive penetration happens, then it is plausible that imagining plays an important role. I apply the epistemology of imagining to cognitive penetration and contend that because of the role imagining plays in cognitive penetration, some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences can fail to justify.
13:00–14:30: Lunch
14:30–16:00: Daniel Waxman (Lingnan University)
Imagining the Infinite
When considering the phenomenology and philosophy of mathematics it is sometimes hard not to slip into talking of a faculty of mathematical intuition. However, the idea that we have such a faculty is on reflection extremely problematic and gives rise to many pressing, even insurmountable, philosophical puzzles. My aim in this talk will be to examine the extent to which the cognitive and epistemological role traditionally assigned to mathematical intuition can be played, in contrast, by a kind of sensory or quasi-perceptual imagination. I'll argue for the (perhaps surprising) claim that we can imagine scenarios in which some of our best mathematical theories are true; since these mathematical theories postulate infinite objects, this implicates an ability on our part to imagine the infinite. In order to substantiate this claim I will introduce and sketch a dynamic conception of imagination. I will conclude by discussing some of its possible epistemological implications.
16:00–16:15: Break
16:15–17:45: Neil Van Leeuwen (Georgia State University)
Pretense is Representation
What is it to pretend? My hypothesis comes from the language we use to describe pretense. We talk about pretense behaviors as though they have contents. “He's pretending that he is a dinosaur.” “She's pretending that a swarm of bees is attacking her.” “They are pretending that they are in a duel.” These descriptions are interesting precisely because the majority of behaviors do not have contents. Going to the bank, for example, does not have contents. It’s just going to the bank. One does not, “go to the bank that p.” Nor does one, “eat a sandwich that q.” But when we describe pretending, we often do describe it—the behavior itself—as having propositional content. For example, “He is pretending that he’s riding a horse.” I thus propose that pretense behaviors are themselves representations. More specifically, to pretend that p is to produce, using one’s body and other props, a representation that has p as content, where one’s body, one’s motions, and one’s props are constituents of the representation. In this talk, I develop and refine this view, note some problems it solves, contrast it with competitors, and develop an action theory of pretense based partly on Goldman's (1970) A Theory of Human Action.